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The Counterpurchase Contracts and
Their Contractual Issues
Joseph J. van Dort*
Eilard Friese**
I. Introduction
In recent years, the use of countertrade transactions has in-
creased dramatically. At first, this kind of trade was closely associ-
ated with East-West trade; however, it is now becoming more and
more popular in North-South and East-South relations.' At the root
of this recent surge in countertrade activities are shifts in interna-
tional economic conditions. The rapid increase in the cost of key im-
ports has left importing nations with significantly diminished sup-
plies of hard currency. In addition, less developed countries, partly
because of the worldwide recession and decreasing prices of primary
commodities, have had to contend with declining exports and in-
creasing protectionism in the markets to which they export.' These
trends have often resulted in serious balance of payment deficiencies.
Increasingly, more countries in the world need their limited sup-
ply of foreign currency to service their international debts and to
purchase essential imports. As a result, barter and countertrade ar-
rangements between industrialized Western countries and less-devel-
oped and eastern-European countries are becoming more wide-
spread.' Parties imposing countertrade requirements are usually
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** Tax consultant with the firm Kammer Luhrman & Co., associated with Deloitte,
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1. Rajski, Some Legal Aspects of International Compensation Trade 35 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 128, 129 (1986) [hereinafter Rajski]. See also Walsh, Countertrade: Not Just for East-
West Anymore, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 3 (1983) [hereinafter Walsh]; Fontaine, Aspects
Juridiques des Contrats de Compensation; 2 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNA-
TIONAL (DPCI) 179, 181 (1981) [hereinafter Fontaine].
2. International Monetary Fund, 1983 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions 44 at 5 (1983). After an export growth in the late seventies, export
growth after 1980 was almost static or even declined. Zarin, Countertrade and the Law, 18
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 235-38 (1984) [hereinafter Zarin] citing Estimates of Busi-
ness Trend Analysts Inc., The World of Countertrade, and Analysis of the Current Environ-
ment and Prospects for Future Growth 13, 31 (1983).
3. Welt, Countertrade as a Competitive Tool, MGMT. REV. 53, 54 (1986) [hereinafter
Welt]; Zarin, supra note 2 at 238; Grabow, Negotiating and Drafting Contracts in Interna-
tional Barter and Countertrade Transactions 9 N.C.J. INT'L. L. & CoM. REG. 255 (1984)
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sovereign nations' purchasing products and technology in the inter-
national marketplace. Parties that encounter these requirements are
generally private companies. Normally, such companies would prefer
conventional forms of trade, but they accept the risk and the incon-
venience of countertrade in order to complete the sale of their prod-
ucts to their buyers in the Third World or in eastern-European coun-
tries.5 Countertrade, of course, means a major departure from
conventional forms of commercial dealing. Countertrade violates
many of the major principles of our free market system as a coer-
cive, anticompetitive practice.' Whether countertrade in a specific
case violates those principles laid down in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a question that is not always simple to
answer, for a potential problem exists. That question, however, ex-
tends beyond the scope of this article.'
Countertrade also raises a series of far-reaching legal issues re-
garding antitrust, import relief and unfair trade practices. These is-
sues have received ample attention, especially in the American legal
environment.' This article will limit itself to a short overview of the
legal problems one can encounter upon entering into a countertrade
and a counterpurchase agreement. This article first addresses the
three main forms of countertrade and then considers the private law
implications of countertrade and counterpurchase agreements.
II. Forms of Countertrade Arrangements
A. Barter
Pure barter9 is probably the world's most ancient form of com-
merce. Barter is generally defined as a transaction that provides for
a direct exchange of goods or services of equal value between two
parties without any cash changing hands.10 In pure barter transac-
tions, the parties always trade directly with each other; consequently,
[hereinafter Grabow].
4. See Welt, supra note 3, at 54 where he states that in 1986 there were more than 91
countries practicing some degree of countertrade among which more than 81 countries had
actual pro-countertrade government policies. For a number of examples, see Walsh, supra note
1, at 6-8.
5. McVey, Countertrade: Commercial Practices, Legal Issues and Policy Dilemmas, 16
LAW POL'Y. INT'L. Bus. 1, 7 (1984) [hereinafter McVey].
6. Id. at 2-3; see also infra note 8.
7. For a full treatment of this issue see Zarin, supra note 2, at 241-47 and McVey,
supra note 5, at 35-69.
8. See Zarin, supra note 2, at 241-83 and McVey, supra note 5, at 35-56.
9. Grabow, supra note 3, at 259. More complicated barter transactions exist: there can
be three or more parties; the exchange can take place over a longer period of time; and cur-
rency can be utilized to offset variations in the values of bartered goods. McVey, Countertrade
and Barter: Alternative Trade Financing by Third World Nations, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 197,
201 (1980-1981).
10. Grabow, supra note 3, at 259. See also Rajski, supra note 1, at 130.
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each party to the transaction must desire what the other offers. Such
pure barter contracts are rare in international trade.
B. Compensation Arrangements/Buy-Back
A compensation or buy back transactions may be described as a
long-term arrangement which involves a party that is under an obli-
gation to deliver equipment, licenses or know-how for the construc-
tion of an industrial installation, and is committed to rendering ap-
propriate technical services. This party undertakes to buy, over a
fixed period, products resulting from those installations, in total or in
part payment. 1 Identification of the compensation goods is normally,
if not always, well known in advance. Parties, therefore, can deter-
mine more precisely the quality and quantity of these goods, and
may agree on the time limits for delivery. Prices also can be deter-
mined more easily. Since the risks to all parties are readily assessa-
ble, the elaborate contracts used in compensation arrangements do
not encounter the same problems as the contracts used in the third
main form of countertrade, namely counterpurchase.
C. Counterpurchase
Counterpurchase is the linkage of a sales transaction for the ex-
port of goods, technology, or services with reciprocal purchases of
products from the purchaser's country. Counterpurchase transactions
outnumber any other form of countertrade. They are particularly ev-
ident in East-West trade."2 In an East-West counterpurchase agree-
ment, the reciprocal purchase commitment of the Western company,
stated in terms of a percentage of the original sale, is more often less
than one hundred percent. The duration of the counterpurchase com-
mitment is usually from one to three years.'3 Both parties generally
pay cash for the services or products received. Payment is made in a
so-called hard currency and usually by means of a letter of credit.
III. Establishing the Contract
A. Contract Negotiations
How the contract between the Western company and the Third
World country is established is often important for the bargaining
position. If the Third World country has initiated the negotiations, it
will normally be more interested in the deal than when it is ap-
11. Rajski, supra note 1, at 133. See also Zarin, supra note 2, at 236 n.l.
12. Hober, Countertrade: Negotiating the Terms, Part 1, INT'L FINANCIAL L. REV. 28
(Mar. 1987); see also, Countertrade: Negotiating the Terms, Part 2, INT'L FINANCIAL L. REV.
17 (Apr. 1987) [hereinafter Hobr].
13. Mishkin, Countertrade and Barter: The Basic Legal Structure, INT'L Bus. LAW. 11
(Jan. 1986) [hereinafter Mishkin].
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proached by the Western exporter. This fact may be of importance
for the contents of the subsequent counterpurchase contract. The
terms and conditions of financing offered by the exporter are also
very important. An attractive scheme that guarantees a low interest
rate limits the incentive for the importer to negotiate a high counter-
purchase requirement. In countries with a planned economy, the
Western exporter should be aware that his direct partner in the ne-
gotiations (the manufacturer) is normally not the party who makes
the final decision. Normally, it is the foreign trade office (FTO) of
that country which has final approval of the deal.14 Moreover, it is
often the FTO which comes forward with the counterpurchase re-
quirements.1 5 Clearly, a Western company interested in exporting to
a foreign country should look into that second party's past history of
negotiations. The demand for a counterpurchase commitment should
not come as an absolute surprise. The Western company should plan
ahead to ensure that it possesses the distribution channels to market
and sell the goods it receives as a (partial) quid pro quo for the
goods or services it hopes to sell. The Western company should also
carefully check whether there exist any valid, applicable import re-
strictions on the goods it wants to counterpurchase.
During the actual negotiations, the Western exporter must, if
necessary, raise the issue of a possible counterpurchase require-
ment.1 In any case, a Western company should defer any final price
quote until agreement has been reached on all terms of the sale.
B. Form of the Contract
Normally, countertrade and counterpurchase contracts should
consist of two separate purchase agreements with a third agreement,
the protocol, linking the two together. 7 Separate contracts make it
easier to obtain financing from a bank for the primary sale, and to
receive export guarantees and/or export insurance. Separate agree-
ments also make it possible to assign rights under each of the
purchase contracts. An additional advantage is that, upon assign-
ment of the contract, the conditions of the export contract will re-
14. In countries with a planned economy, it is not the producer, but a government
agency commonly referred to as a FTO, which has final approval. See Report Netherlands
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Report of the Study on Countertrade 1, 83 (1984) [hereinafter
Report Ministry of Economic Affairs]. For the use of FTO's see also Fontaine, supra note I at
184 et seq. For a definition of FTO's, see Grabow, supra note 3, at 257 n.9.
15. This is contrary to popular belief. This was established in the survey conducted
which led to the Report Ministry of Economic Affairs supra note 14, at 84.
16. If the FIO does not raise the issue, the Western Exporter should do so, because the
countertrade requirement "risk" should be calculated in the price quote. See, Report Ministry
of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 83-84.




main secret." This three-part division of the contract makes applica-
ble to the two purchase agreements the normal obligations, liabilities
and rights of the purchaser and seller under the law. In some if not
most countries, however, this would be true even if the countertrade
agreements had to be considered a pure barter transaction. 9 The
relation between the two sales/purchase contracts is then explicitly
laid down in the protocol. If there is no protocol, or no explicit clause
with regard to the relation of the contracts in the protocol, the rela-
tion is not clear and will be considered under the applicable law or in
the light of good business practices.2"
The DPCI working group 1 expressed the view that if the export
agreement (primary agreement) is not executed (fulfilled), the im-
port agreement (secondary agreement) need not be fulfilled. The
working group also arrived at this same result for annulment or a
breach of contract under the export agreement." The reasoning of
the working group is that the export contract constitutes the raison
d'Etre for the import contract.
Generally, the Western company is only induced to enter into
the secondary contract because it wants to export, and not because it
really wants to receive goods in return for money. This is probably
the reason why Fontaine describes the export contract as the "con-
trat principal" (primary contract) and the import contract as the
"contre-achat" or the "contrat accessoire."'23 This reasoning is of du-
bious validity in light of the legal relation established in the agree-
ments. One of the two contracts is not more important. One is really
the condition precedent for the other; the secondary contract being
the condition for entering into the primary contract, and perform-
ance under the primary contract the condition for performance
18. It is often advantageous to keep certain contract conditions secret, e.g., the price.
19. R.J.V.F. Bertrams, Internationale Ruilhandel, N.J.B. 1389, 1392 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Bertrams]. Bertrams cites the Netherlands (1582 B.W.), Germany (Article 515 B.G.B.)
and France (Article 1707 C.C.). England is an exception to the rule. Under the definition
provided in Sale of Goods Act, § 61 (1977) barter is not a sale. See Ellington, Compensation
Contracts and Set-off in English Law DPCI 225, 228 (1981), "English Courts seek to avoid
the conclusion that a transaction is indeed barter and will often construe the facts as, say,
reciprocal sales." Id. at 228.
20. See Fontaine, supra note 1, at 189-91 for a discussion of this subject with emphasis
on French and German law. Fontaine comes to the conclusion that under French and German
law there is a good case to support the view that if the primary agreement is not fulfilled, the
secondary agreement does not have to be fulfilled. Under French law there is no case law in
either direction. German case law after a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of July 12, 1972
(as published in Wertpapiermitteilungen, 1972, 1351) points in the direction indicated by
Fontaine. For a discussion on the potential problems under Netherlands law, see Bertrams,
supra note 19, at 1393.
21. The Fontaine article, supra note 1, is the result of the research of a working group
of attorneys, law professors and in-house counsels from civil and common law countries.
22. Fontaine, supra note 1, at 190.
23. Id. at 184, where Fontaine for the first time uses the word "contrat principal." In his
summary of the Report in DPCI 161, 166 (1982) he mentions the "contrat de contre-achat"
and the "contrat accessoire."
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under the secondary contract. Each party has its own specific inter-
est. All these problems can and should be avoided by inserting the
link in the protocol or in the secondary agreement. The choice of law
clause for the linkage can also be of crucial importance.
If it is desirable that the two agreements remain completely iso-
lated and independent of each other, 4 the protocol should recite the
independent nature of each agreement, and specify that the failure
of performance by one party in one contract will not defeat the
rights of the parties under the other agreement. As noted above, in a
countertrade transaction, the secondary (import) agreement is often
entered into by the Western company for the exclusive purpose of
obtaining the first contract. Western countries in this position may
wish to provide for a link of the contracts in the protocol, by ex-
pressly stating that the cancellation of the primary contract will re-
sult in cancellation of the import contract, or even classification of
that contract as null and void. Such a clause contains some inherent
vagueness, and can lead to undesired results if the first contract is
partly fulfilled. It, therefore, seems advisable to insert the clause only
if necessary, or to place it in the secondary contract. If the secondary
agreement is dependent on the primary agreement, in the authors'
view, both the entire protocol and the "whereas clause"25 can be de-
leted.26 If a contract drafter deems these general clauses necessary,27
he must take care when including them, to avoid provisions that
would cause the two contracts to merge into a single instrument.
C. The Export-Contract as Primary Contract
The export or primary contract is the standard agreement for
the transnational sale of goods and services. If either the protocol or
the secondary contract provides for a link, insofar as cancellation of
the primary contract means cancellation of the secondary agreement,
it is necessary for the Third World or eastern-European countries to
pay special attention to the reasons for termination or cancellation of
24. Taking into account the different legal systems, it seems wise to decide what will
happen if the primary contract is not fulfilled, e.g., separate contracts make it easier to obtain
financing from a bank for the primary sale, to receive export guarantees and to assign the
rights under each of the contracts. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
25. In the "whereas" of "preambular" clauses of the contracts, parties often describe
what happened during the negotiations. These introductory clauses (also called recitals) are
placed before Article I of the contract. They tend to state things like: "because the FTO
demanded a counterpurchase and we were willing to accept this, we entered into the contract."
These clauses can easily make the two contracts conditional on each other, especially under a
civil law regime.
26. The "whereas clause" could lead to confusion while the Protocol is normally used to
provide a link between the two contracts. If this link is already laid down in one or both
purchase contracts, the Protocol becomes superfluous.
27. E.g., Because in the legal system that governs the contract such clauses are normal




the contract. In certain circumstances, it can be very attractive for
the Western exporter to invoke the force majeure clause.28 The
Third World country should therefore always seek to limit the scope
of the force majeure clause or its results.29
Since a shortage of hard currency is often the primary reason
for the importer to negotiate a counterpurchase, the importer should
secure payment of the counterpurchase goods. If the importer does
not secure this payment, it will end up having spent its valuable hard
currency without receiving it back under the secondary agreement.
Payment can be effected by documented credits or stand-by letters
of credit. Parties can also demand bank guarantees. Since it is often
difficult for a Third World country to obtain a bank guarantee from
a first class international bank, parties typically negotiate payment
into an escrow account and link the counterpurchase ratio with the
amount initially paid, increased by the accrued interest. On the basis
of the security of the escrow account, the bank can then issue a bank
guarantee. The guarantee will be phrased in such a way that it will
be proportionally reduced as counterpurchases are made by the
Western exporter when he presents the agreed documents to the
bank.30 The bank guarantee will often state that it expires on the last
day of the time period specified for the performance under the
counterpurchase contract.3 1
D. The Counterpurchase Contract, the Import Contract as Sec-
ondary Contract
The secondary contract is of utmost importance in countertrade
agreements. This contract reflects the "involuntary" nature of the
sales agreement. This contract often requires tougher negotiations
and presents more difficult drafting problems.3 It is important to
keep in mind that the counterpurchase agreement merely constitutes
an undertaking to purchase goods at some time in the future. The
actual purchase of goods from the importer is often covered by a
28. Normally, it is the Third World country that is very eager to conclude the contract.
The Western exporter often concludes the contract, because it is the only way to extend his
market. If the Western exporter finds another buyer or discovers that he can not sell or market
the counterpurchase goods, e.g., for logistic reasons or because of the price level, he may seek a
way out of the contract.
29. E.g., It should be stated on the face of the primary contract whether application of
the force majeure clause dissolves or merely suspends the agreement.
30. For different ways to secure payment see Bertrams supra, note 19 at 1396; Hober
(Apr. 1987), supra note 12, at 18. The Third World country can, in lieu of the securities
mentioned in the text, also negotiate a penalty clause, secured by a bank guarantee. If the
Western exporter does not fulfill its obligations, it forfeits a penalty which in theory, of course,
can be for the same amount as the counterpurchase obligation of the Western Exporter. See
infra § E8.
31. For a general discussion on penalty clauses, see infra § III E8.
32. The primary contract is a standard sales contract. In the secondary contract, the
special countertrade clauses come into play.
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fulfillment agreement, which again represents a standard interna-
tional contract for the sale of goods. The main clauses of such a
contract are discussed below.
E. Contractual Provisions
1. Cancellation Clause.-The cancellation clause is optional.
When included, it usually states that cancellation of the primary
agreement will lead to automatic termination of the secondary
agreement. Usually, it is better to phrase the cancellation clause in
such a way that the exporter (i.e. the Western Company) has the
option to cancel."3 Most Third World countries will fiercely oppose
this clause because it means that they may be unable to receive a
return of hard currency. As importer, the Third World countries
typically prefer a clause that provides for renegotiation. If parties
desire a complete independence of the contracts, they cannot use the
cancellation clause. However, the same effect can be reached by a
careful drafting of the choice of law clause since some legal systems
will consider both contracts related, even if there is no formal link
whatsoever.3 Thus, even when the courts decide that no link has
been created on the face of the contracts, the applicable law may
create a relationship between them.
"From a practical point of view the most important relationship
is that of set-off."' 35 In set-off, "a party claiming failure of perform-
ance by the other party under one agreement may be entitled to
withhold amounts due to the other party under a separate and unre-
lated agreement."38 In order to minimize unpleasant surprises
caused by set-off, the relevant provisions of the applicable law should
be scrutinized in detail.
2. Time Period for Performance.-The counterpurchase
agreement should specify the time limit in which the Western coun-
try is required to fulfill its obligation. The Third World or Eastern-
Bloc country will try to limit the performance period because it
wants its hard currency back as soon as possible. The Western com-
pany seeks as much time as possible before performance is due. The
33. For a Western Company, an automatic cancellation can be beneficial, but also detri-
mental. It is beneficial in most cases because the counterpurchase agreement was involuntary
in the first place. However, it can be detrimental if the rights under the contract are assigned
or when the Western Company has a genuine interest in the goods or products.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 17-27.
35. Hob6r (Mar. 1987), supra note 12, at 30.
36. Id. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1230 (5th ed. 1979), quoting Edmonds v.
Stratton 457 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970): "A counter-claim demand which defend-
ant holds against plaintiff, arising out of a transaction extrinsic of plaintiffs cause of action.
Remedy employed by defendant to discharge or reduce plaintiffs demand by an opposite one
arising from a transaction, which is extrinsic to plaintiffs cause of action."
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longer the period, the more time the exporter has to organize the
marketing of the products or find a third party who buys -all the
goods at one time. Absent a clause negating the effect, a longer pe-
riod will bring extra revenues out of interest. In many cases, the
Third World country will agree on a relatively long period because it
can not produce sufficient counterpurchase goods in a short period of
time. The length of the period is usually one to three years.3 8
3. Range of Counterpurchase Products.-The Western export
company will want to choose from as wide a range of products as
possible. The other party typically wants to limit the list of available
products to products it can not sell directly on the market.39 If the
importer in the primary country is a specific government agency, it
will try to include on the list of counterpurchase products the prod-
ucts it manufactures or grows itself.40 In such cases, a Western ex-
porter should always try to negotiate a linkage with other govern-
ment agencies. And, the Western company should try to obtain as
extensive a list of products as possible. The Western company can
thereby prevent the situation in which it later discovers that the
products on the list are no longer produced, a true hazard in coun-
tries with a planned economy. Permission to establish linkage is
often hard to obtain. Therefore, to entice the importing country's au-
thorities into agreeing to linkage, linkage fees are sometimes used. 1
4. Quantity of the Countertrade Products.-The quantity of
countertrade products is normally expressed in a so-called compensa-
tion ratio.42 This ratio gives the percentage of the value of the West-
ern company's sale that is the subject of countertrade. This percent-
age is sometimes 100% or close to 100%, but is more often between
10 and 30 percent.4 s For developing countries, this ratio is often low,
because the export contract is for goods or services recognized and
37. In the meantime, the Western exporters can accrue interest on the purchase price
received from the Third World importer. See infra, text accompanying notes 28-31 and
Mishkin, supra note 13, at 11.
38. See Grabow, supra note 3, at 265; see also Mishkin, supra note 13, at 11; McVey,
supra note 9, at 202 n.18.
39. See Report Ministry of Economic Affairs supra note 14, at 73, where it is stated
that the list of counterpurchase goods published by the Indonesian government at that time
(1984) contained 33 products, but excluded oil. See also Grabow, supra note 3, at 263.
40. See Grabow, supra note 3, at 263. FTO's are generally granted exclusive authority
to handle both import and export transactions for a specified area of products. Id. at 258 n.9.
In such circumstances, it is obvious that the FTO for heavy industries will pay for a large
machine with products generated by such machine or with products produced by the branch
members.
41. See Hobor (Mar. 1987), supra note 12, at 31.
42. See Grabow, supra note 3, at 262 and Rajski, supra note 1, at 133.
43. See Report Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 59, where it is stated
that the study based on returned questionnaires revealed an average counterpurchase ratio of
25% for East-West trade. See also, Grabow, supra note 3, at 262.
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financed by the exporter's government as a development aid pro-
ject. "4' A so-called soft loan usually pays for about 80 percent of the
necessary goods or services." The willingness to negotiate a percent-
age differs from country to country. If the goods to be purchased are
of an essential nature or highly advanced and hard to obtain on the
market, the compensation ratio decreases and can even approach
zero. Some countries, by statute, require a counterpurchase of
100%. 46
5. Price.-Like any sales contract, the counterpurchase con-
tract will state the price of the goods. Commonly, the goods must be
purchased over a period of one or more years. Normally, the prod-
ucts to be purchased by the Western company are not specified in
the contract. However, the contract does often contain a pricing
formula. The pricing formula will usually refer to the normal market
price of the goods at the time of purchase."7
A Western company should seek a most-favored customer
clause. This clause shields the company from loss in the event that,
over the life of the contract, its own market should be flooded by
lower priced products from the same country. The Western exporter
who succeeds in bargaining for a long time period must protect him-
self from such fluctuations in the market. It is often wise to insert a
clause which provides for periodical adjustment of the price.
6. Quality of the Goods.-The counterpurchase goods are
often of an inferior quality, and consequently low in demand. The
importer will try to sell to the Western company goods it will not
normally be able to sell on the market."8 To protect the purchaser,
the contract should set forth detailed specifications for acceptable
44. E.g., Gabon needs a new road to connect the airport to the city. The French govern-
ment is willing to pay for 80% of the cost of the total project as long as French contractors will
receive the contract. The French contractors then only have to receive 20% of the actual price
from the Gabon government. An imposed counterpurchase duty is then easier to bear. The
profit on the project possibly exceeds 20% and very probably the sale of the counterpurchase
goods will bring in at least some money.
45. This is an international bank term, also used by the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. A soft-loan is a loan on conditions more lenient than one would be able
to acquire in the market.
46. In Indonesia, government investments exceeding the amount of USD I million re-
quire a compensation of 100%. See Grabow, supra note 3, at 262 n.21. Grabow mentions USD
750,000, but this amount, because of the exchange rate, is now closer to USD 1,000,000. Iran
and China have requirements which in some cases and for some products comes close to 100%.
See Report Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 77 (Iran) and 80 (China).
47. Terms refer to "the acceptable international price at time of purchase" or "10%
below the fair market value of the goods in the first party's home country." See McVey, supra
note 9, at 209, 210; Fontaine, supra note 1, at 195; and Hob~r (Mar. 1987), supra note 12, at
31.
48. See supra note 39. Japan buys close to 100% of Indonesia's oil. See Report Ministry
of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 72; McVey, supra note 5, at 10 n.23, citing Indonesian
Guidelines. See also Grabow, supra note 3, at 263.
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goods, or should at least state that the products have export quality.
In all counterpurchase contracts, the Western country should
bargain for the right to appoint an independent surveyor to check
the goods before shipment. This right helps to avoid serious problems
that may arise if the Western country is sued for breach of contract
or product liability for defects in the counterpurchase products it
sells.
7. Delivery.-The Western company often deals with govern-
ments or government agencies who more or less control the availabil-
ity of the counterpurchase products. The contract should contain a
specific date of delivery or, in the case of periodic purchases, a speci-
fied time in which delivery should be made. Non-fulfillment on the
delivery date, should explicitly be stipulated as a material breach of
contract and should entitle the Western company to opt for termina-
tion of the contract.49
8. Penalty clause.-Due to the "involuntary" nature of the
counterpurchase requirement, the Western company should seek the
enactment of a penalty clause in the secondary agreement. This
clause is intended to limit the potential liability for breach of con-
tract. In the event the Western company is no longer interested in
fulfilling, or can not fulfill its obligations, such a provision will en-
able the company to calculate its risk. If the penalty negotiated is
not excessive, the penalty provision can serve as an escape clause.5"
The penalty may be lower than either the discount the Western
country will have to grant the distributor of the goods, or the charge
for administrative costs and the exporter's selling costs. If, for exam-
ple, the counterpurchase ratio is 30% of the export transaction and
the penalty is 10%, the costs would only amount to 3%.51 Payment of
the penalty then extinguishes any further obligations of the Western
company. Of course, by invoking such a clause, the Western com-
pany risks its chances of establishing a long-lasting relation with the
49. See supra text accompanying note 28. See also Grabow, supra note 3, at 267-68
where he states that frequent and often substantial delay in delivery is one of the greatest
difficulties Western companies encounter when entering into countertrade transactions. Late
delivery under most legal systems will constitute a material breach of contract. The question
can, however, arise regardless of whether every late delivery is a material breach. The question
"when" can be important in order to be relieved under a bank guarantee or to receive back
monies in an escrow account. See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
50. See Report Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 89, where
it is stated that the average penalty in contracts with eastern-European countries is between 10
and 15%. See also Grabow, supra note 3, at 268, who mentions 10-20% as the average
penalty.
51. This does happen. A penalty of 10% may make it easier to sell the products available
for counterpurchase to another Western exporter for an attractive price. One should not forget,
however, that most countries that impose counterpurchase requirements have a hard time in
producing the products. See also Report Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 89.
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import country. Undoubtedly, any future contract between these two
signatories will specify a penalty clause containing a much higher
percentage. Often the importer insists on a penalty clause secured by
a bank guarantee.5 2 The clause should state that the penalty is to be
considered as payment of liquidated damages, 53 and that the right to
claim actual damages is waived by the importer. This penalty clause
can benefit both parties.54
9. Marketing restrictions.-The contract should entitle the
Western company to market and sell the counterpurchase goods free
of any restrictions. The Western company may even negotiate an
exclusive distributorship in certain markets. On the other hand, the
Third World country will want to limit the marketability of the
goods in order to increase the possibility of concluding countertrade
deals with exporters from other countries.
10. Assignment.-The Western company will try to negotiate
the transferability of countertrade obligations. Most Third World
countries will not allow assignment (i.e. substitution of the debtor)
without sufficient security that the assignee will meet the obligations
of the exporter. 55 Here the bank guarantee can again play an impor-
tant role. Assignment for the Western company is important, for it
enables the company to transfer its counterpurchase obligation to a
trade house or barter business club. Upon assignment, the Western
company will be released from its counterpurchase obligation, and
the assignee, normally a trading house, becomes a party to the
counterpurchase agreement.
11. Force majeure.-A clause should be included which pro-
vides that the seller shall not be held responsible for the delay or
nondelivery of the goods due to force majeure. The force majeure
doctrine is different in every legal system. There are notable differ-
ences between the impossibility doctrine under American or English
law (common law countries in general) and the risk attribution the-
52. A bank guarantee provides better security than an unsecured claim, which still has
to be recognized in a court of law. For a practical example, see Hob6r (Apr. 1987), supra note
12, at 18.
53. See Grabow, supra note 3, at 268 n.29. This seems true for common law jurisdic-
tions, but not for civil law jurisdictions. See also Fontaine, supra note I at 198-99 and P.
Benjamin, Penalties, Liquidated Damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts: A
Comparative Study of English and Continental Law, INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 600 (1960).
54. See Fontaine, supra note 1, at 198, where he states (translated from French by the
authors): "The experience of the Group is that certain Western exporters never have any in-
tention to actually fulfill their counterpurchase obligation, but in lieu thereof from the begin-
ning have the intention to pay the penalty." Id. at 198 n.34. The Group found that there are
also FTO's that make it as hard as possible for the Western company to fulfill its obligations
in the hope that the Western company will terminate the contract by paying the penalty.
55. Who is both the assignor and original purchaser.
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ory in civil law countries. 6 What is considered an act of God may
also differ from country to country. Therefore, a very detailed force
majeure clause is recommended. Furthermore, the clause should
specify under what conditions the contract is suspended, and in what
circumstances it can be terminated, and by whom. The clause must
also assign the risks of subsequent government measures.
12. Dispute settlement.-Both the primary and the secondary
contracts should identify the preferred forum for dispute settlement
and the chosen law applicable to the contract. If the parties have
failed to state a method of dispute resolution, the court of the de-
fendant will normally obtain jurisdiction.57 Normally, however, par-
ties do provide for arbitration. 8 The possibilities of arbitration are
widely known. In East-West countertrade, arbitration in Stockholm
and Vienna under the UNCITRAL rules is popular.59 In other
countertrade transactions, arbitration by the ICC in Paris, or else-
where under the ICC-rules, is often preferred.6 0 In attempting to re-
solve those difficulties that might compromise the continuous per-
formance of a contract, the parties should first state in specific and
detailed fashion the circumstances in which the contract may be
adapted.61 They may then insert an ICC regulatory clause in the
contract providing for intervention by a third person. Finally, the
parties should define precisely the scope of the intervention by a
56. It is very hard indeed to chart the different definitions of force majeure and even
more difficult to point out when they will lead to a different result. In the German Civil Code,
it is stated that "[tihe debtor is relieved from his obligation to perform if the performance
becomes impossible because of a circumstance, for which he is not responsible, occurring after
the creation of the obligatioi." Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] art. 275 (W. Ger.). The com-
parable provision in the Dutch Code is much shorter. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] art. 1281
(Neth.). However, case law interprets the Dutch provision much like the German one; French
law is also very similar. Cf. J. BENJAMIN. SALES-OF GOODs 316 (2d ed. 1981) (summary of
French law).
57. Some countries like the Netherlands, however, also know a so-called forum actoris.
The Forum Actoris provides that, absent a clause to the contrary, the forum of the Nether-
lands' plaintiff is competent. See Article 126(1) B.W.
58. Very rarely are disputes solved in court or by arbitration. Most often, parties negoti-
ate a commercial solution. See Report Ministry of Economic Affairs, supra note 14, at 89.
59. All eastern-European countries are a party to the New York Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
(1959), and will therefore recognize a foreign arbitration award.
60. Designation of the institution as "the ICC" should be sufficient since there exists
only one International Chamber of Commerce in the world. Parties often add "in Paris." By
doing so they avoid possible confusions with other arbitration bodies, but they also induce the
ICC Court of Arbitration to consider it to be their will that Paris be the place of arbitration. It
is preferable that the parties, after clearly identifying the Institution to which they will refer
their disputes, state in writing any agreement they may have reached on the place of arbitra-
tion. Absent an agreement, parties may wish to insert "the place of arbitration shall be fixed
by the ICC Court of Arbitration." See ICC Publication No. 382, Guide to Arbitration, at 30
(1983).
61. The adaptation could arise from the lack of precision in the contractual provisions,
or from the existence of gaps.
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third person, by adopting one of the ICC standard clauses."
The ICC also offers a service for parties who believe that a con-
ciliation attempt by a neutral third person may be useful. Concilia-
tion under the ICC-Rules for Optional Conciliation is, as indicated
in the name, optional; it occurs only when the parties agree to it."5
Arbitration remains optional, even if provisions for conciliation have
been made through a clause inserted in the contract.64
The choice of applicable law is another important issue. Under
private international law, 8 it is recognized that a contract is gov-
erned by the law of the most characteristic obligation. 6 For exam-
ple, in sales contracts, the law of the most characteristic obligation is
the law of the seller. This rule appears in all international conven-
tions on international sales of goods and in the EEC6" Execution
Treaty (EEX). If no choice of law is made, the law of the seller will
normally govern the contract. In the view of the DFCI working
group, this means that the law of the seller in the primary contra6t
(the Western country) governs both the primary and the secondary
contract; this second contract is only an accessory of the primary
contract.6 8 The normal choice of law in countertrade agreements is
the law of the seller.69 This means that the primary and secondary
62. The two standard ICC clauses are:
Clause A: In the event that the parties are unable to agree to apply all or
any of the provisions of article(s) ...of this contract, they shall apply to the
Standing Committee for the Regulation of Contractual Relations of the ICC in
order that a third person (or board of three persons) who shall be appointed in
accordance with the Rules on the Regulation of Contractual Relations of the
ICC, and who shall carry out his mission in accordance with the said Rules, may
issue a recommendation.
or
Clause B: In the event ...and who shall carry out his mission in accor-
dance with the said Rules may on their behalf make a final decision which shall
be binding on the parties and shall be deemed to be incorporated in the contract.
See ICC Publication No. 382 supra note 60, at 13.
63. The Conciliation Rules are part of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration
(1975), published as Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration (1975), I.C.C. Publication No.
291.
64. See Article 5 Conciliation Rules: "Should a settlement not result, the parties shall
be at liberty to refer their dispute to arbitration or to bring an action at law should they so
desire, unless they are bound by an arbitration clause.
65. Often termed conflict of laws.
66. See, e.g., Article 4, para. 2 EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, Rome, June 19, 1980.
67. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Dec. 22, 1986, The Hague, art. 8, para. I. The Convention derives its official date from the
date it was signed by the first party, Czechoslovakia. The Convention is designated as the
conflict of laws complement of the Vienna Convention of April 11, 1980 on the International
Sale of Goods (Trb. 1986, 61).
68. Fontaine, supra note 1, at 203: "On devra donc se r6f6rer aux principes g6nerdux du
droit international priv6. Dans la mesure oai l'on reconniit l'existence d'un lien avec le contrat
principal, on pourra sans doute se r6f6rer A la clause de droit applicable de ce contrat."
69. As was stated, the seller performs the most characteristic obligation in a sales con-
tract. Contrary to the DPCI Working Group, most authors and most contract drafters will
consider and/or draft the primary and secondary contracts as two individual sales contracts.
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contract are governed by different laws. To avoid this conflict, par-
ties often agree on the law of the site of arbitration.7"
IV. Conclusion
Countertrade arrangements are a factor of growing importance
in international economic intercourse. They comprise a wide variety
of contractual relations that range from traditional barter to very
elaborate long-lasting contracts. Given the existing structure of the
world's economic and financial condition and the division between
rich and poor countries, countertrade and barter transactions are
here to stay.
Consequently, obligation will lead to the applicability of a different legal system in each sales
contract.
70. The authors, as practitioners, have found that if parties cannot agree on a choice of
law, they will try to agree on a forum and a place of arbitration. Then, because of the availa-
bility of arbitrators, they are tempted to opt for application of the local law of the arbitra-
tor(s). Since the arbitration site is normally located in a neutral country with a well-developed
legal system, parties in practice will take the chance and accept applicability of English,
French or Swiss law, often without knowing the contents of those legal systems.
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